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This year we have an exciting mini-track entitled “Inside the
Insider Threat” planned for you. The mini-track will discuss
the topic of insider threats which are a present and growing
concern to organizations worldwide. This is due in large part
because trusted employees have the capability for inflicting
devastating consequences to their employer’s assets, data,
and IT infrastructure, primarily because of their detailed
knowledge and authorized access these systems. Any
approach therefore must have not only a technical aspect, but
also a non-technical (social, political, legal, cultural, and so
forth) approach. Analyzing and detecting insider threats
involve both technical and non-technical approaches across
many different disciplines, including human-oriented ones.
This mini-track accepted four papers emphasizing this crosscutting work in this exciting and important research area.
The first paper is:
Federated Platooning: Insider Threats and Mitigations
Platoon formation is a freight organization system where a
group of vehicles follows a predefined trajectory maintaining
a desired spatial pattern. Benefits of platooning include fuel
savings, reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, and efficient
allocation of road. In this paper, the authors look at federated
platooning from an insiders' perspective. First, they outline
the basic elements of platooning and federation of platooning
operators. Then, provide a comprehensive analysis to identify
the possible insiders (employees, users, operators, and
federated members) and the threats they pose. Finally, the
authors propose two layered, composable technical solutions
to mitigate those threats:
1) a decentralized overlay network that regulates the
interactions among the stakeholders, useful to mitigate issues
linked to data safety and trustworthiness and
(2) a dynamic federation platform, needed to monitor and
interrupt deviant behaviors of federated members.
The second paper is:
Leader Member Exchange: An Interactive Framework to
Uncover a Deceptive Insider as Revealed by Human
Sensors
This study intends to provide a theoretical ground that
conceptualizes the prospect of detecting insider threats based
on leader-member exchange. This framework specifically

corresponds to two propositions raised by Ho, Kaarst-Brown
et al. [42]. Team members that are geographically co-located
or dispersed are analogized as human sensors in social
networks with the ability to collectively “react” to deception,
even when the act of deception itself is not obvious to any
one member. Close interactive relationships are the key to
afford a network of human sensors an opportunity to
formulate baseline knowledge of a deceptive insider. The
research hypothesizes that groups unknowingly impacted by
a deceptive leader are likely to use certain language-action
cues when interacting with each other after a leader violates
group trust.
The third paper is:
Modeling Expert Judgments of Insider Threat Using
Ontology Structure: Effects of Individual Indicator
Threat Value and Class Membership
The authors describe research on a comprehensive ontology
of sociotechnical and organizational factors for insider threat
(SOFIT) and results of an expert knowledge elicitation study.
The study examined how alternative insider threat
assessment models may reflect associations among constructs
beyond the relationships defined in the hierarchical class
structure. Results clearly indicate that individual indicators
contribute differentially to expert judgments of insider threat
risk. Further, models based on ontology class structure more
accurately predict expert judgments. There is some empirical
evidence that other associations among constructs—such as
the roles that indicators play in an insider threat exploit—
may also contribute to expert judgments of insider threat risk.
Implications for research and practice are discussed.
The final paper is:
Connected Aircraft: Cyber-Safety Risks and
Management Approaches
The past several years has witnessed significant growth in
Internet Protocol (IP)-based wireless connections between
airborne aircraft, satellites, and terrestrial information
systems, a phenomenon some have termed “The Connected
Aircraft” (Bellamy, 2014). Far eclipsing passenger highspeed internet service, this movement is integrating
thousands of embedded automated sensors connected to
safety-critical systems, such as engines, flight controls,
cockpit displays, and life support systems into the on-line
infrastructure. Airborne sensors continuously send data
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packets to worldwide airframe, engine, and avionics
manufacturers, airline control centers, and third-party
suppliers (Orjih, 2006). The tremendous growth in the
Internet of Things (IoT), small, low-power, programmable,
internet-connected, smart devices, has accelerated the
Connected Aircraft transformation (Lueth, 2014). In short,
winged local area networks are expanding the internet to
30,000 feet. However, connecting aircraft to the internet is
also exposing safety-critical airborne systems to serious
cyber-physical safety risks, to which the traveling public is

largely oblivious. This ignorance is likely to remain until,
heaven forbid, a crash or other incident is directly linked to a
successful cyberattack. This research paper will attempt to
narrow this knowledge gap by shedding light on the growing
cyber-physical safety risks of The Connected Aircraft. It will
also suggest risk management approaches, some already
underway, to help reduce these emerging cyber-safety risks
so that the promising operational, economic, and business
benefits of movement can be realized without exposing the
traveling public to undue safety risk.
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